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Should Chevron Have Two Steps? 
RICHARD M. RE* 
Prominent judges and scholars have criticized the familiar Chevron deference 
scheme on the ground that its two steps are redundant. But each step of traditional 
two-step Chevron actually does unique interpretive work. In short, step one asks 
whether agency interpretations are mandatory, whereas step two asks whether they 
are reasonable. Other judges and scholars defend two-step Chevron on the ground 
that the second step should be equated with arbitrary-and-capricious review. But 
that approach makes Chevron partially redundant with the Administrative 
Procedure Act and compresses the distinct mandatoriness and reasonableness 
questions into an artificially singular first step. This Article identifies a new 
approach, called “optional two-step,” which first asks whether the agency’s view is 
reasonable and then gives courts discretion to determine whether the agency’s view 
is also mandatory. This discretionary decision procedure recognizes that important 
normative considerations underlie the choice between one- and two-step versions 
of Chevron. For example, two-step Chevron fosters the rapid development of 
precedent, whereas one-step enforces norms of judicial restraint. Chevron thus 
resembles qualified-immunity jurisprudence, which has likewise struggled to 
answer the normative question of whether unnecessary holdings should be 
impermissible, obligatory, or optional. Qualified-immunity case law also sheds 
much-needed light on how courts should exercise their Chevron discretion. Finally, 
a review of all published federal appellate decisions citing Chevron in 2011 sheds 
light on current Chevron practice and suggests that optional two-step may best 
explain the tensions underlying current Chevron jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chevron deference has been with us for almost thirty years, and, for the great 
majority of that time, so have the deceptively familiar expressions “Chevron step 
one” and “Chevron step two.”1 In case after case—law review after law review—it 
was intoned that: “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue,” since “the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”2 However, 
“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”3 Thus was the activity of agency deference divided into two discrete 
phases, a first and a second, with the relationship between them a subject of 
constant mystification.4 
Then came an important essay with a title that said it all: “Chevron Has Only 
One Step,” by Professors Matthew C. Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule.5 While 
recognizing that many commentators had “point[ed] out the difficulties of 
distinguishing between Chevron’s two steps,”6 Stephenson and Vermeule were the 
first to conclude unequivocally that Chevron’s two steps are analytically equivalent 
and therefore redundant.7 “The single question,” the authors explained, “is whether 
the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Agency deference cases always involve a threshold inquiry into whether deference 
is appropriate at all. Some commentators refer to this inquiry as “step zero.” See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). By contrast, other commentators 
refer to this threshold issue as the question of whether a particular case falls within 
“Chevron’s domain.” See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). Because it is simpler not to count this ever-present threshold issue as a 
distinct “step,” this Article follows the latter approach. 
 2. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 3. Id. at 843. 
 4. For a prominent example of the academic literature trying to make sense of 
Chevron’s two steps, see Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two 
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254–55 (1997) (arguing that step two should be 
considered identical to arbitrary-and-capricious review); see also infra note 6 (citing other 
treatments). 
 5. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 597 (2009). 
 6. Id. at 597 n.3 (collecting sources). For early suggestions that the two Chevron steps 
might be interchangeable, see Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 30 
F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J.), rev’d, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); Clark Byse, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step 
Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256 n.10 (1988). 
 7. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 599. 
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interpretation . . . .”8 According to Stephenson and Vermeule, we would lose 
nothing—and incur “no collateral cost”—by eliminating one of Chevron’s two 
identical steps.9 
As it happened, the Supreme Court was already moving toward a “one-step” 
view of Chevron. Indeed, the Court had just made a similar point, per Justice 
Antonin Scalia, in a passage that Stephenson and Vermeule excerpted as the 
headnote of their essay. In the quoted passage, the Court explained that it was 
“omitting the supposedly prior [step one] inquiry of ‘whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue’” and was instead proceeding immediately 
to the step-two “proposition . . . that a reasonable agency interpretation prevails.”10 
Step one was superfluous, according to the Court, for “if Congress has directly 
spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has 
said would be unreasonable.”11 That observation notably failed to persuade 
Chevron’s author, Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote in dissent that the Court’s 
revisionist approach was “puzzling.”12 
The years since Stephenson and Vermeule’s essay have been good to the one-
step version of Chevron that they recommended. While the Supreme Court 
sometimes differentiates between the traditional two steps, it more often proceeds 
as though Chevron consisted of a singular precept: if the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable, then that interpretation is entitled to deference and should be 
followed.13 Justice Scalia penned one of the most recent statements of this view, 
and he supported it with a now-familiar citation: “See Stephenson and Vermeule, 
Chevron Has Only One Step.”14 
But every movement meets resistance, and a number of commentators have 
opposed the trend toward one-step Chevron. Most notably, Professors Kenneth A. 
Bamberger and Peter L. Strauss authored a rejoinder that appeared to defend the 
traditional notion that Chevron has two separate steps.15 Yet Bamberger and Strauss 
actually defended two-step Chevron based on their own revisionist view16—
namely, that step two replicates the Administrative Procedure Act’s general 
prohibition on arbitrary-and-capricious agency action.17 Under that approach, a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Id. (“[T]he two Chevron steps both ask this question, just in different ways. As a 
result, the two steps are mutually convertible.”). 
 9. Id. at 609. 
 10. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 241 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 n.1 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 15. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 611 (2009). 
 16. Bamberger and Strauss acknowledge that Chevron is often read in accord with what this 
Article calls “traditional” Chevron. See id. at 613–14 (“Chevron’s language about the ‘precise 
question at issue’ has misled many, both judges and commentators, to characterize Step One as if 
its function were exhausted once a court has found statutory ambiguity . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 17. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (prohibiting “arbitrary” and “capricious” agency action); 
Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 625 (“At this [second] step, Section 706(2) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act sets the general standard . . . .”). 
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court’s own statutory interpretations are confined to step one, whereas step two 
asks whether the agency has undertaken an adequately rational decision-making 
process.18 Many courts in fact follow that alternative model, thereby sowing 
additional confusion regarding Chevron’s proper operation.19 The resulting 
analytical disarray has become so severe that some commentators now cite it as a 
reason to abandon Chevron altogether.20 
This Article begins by isolating the invaluable insights of prior commentary. On 
the one hand, Stephenson and Vermeule correctly gleaned that there is often no 
difference between Chevron’s two steps. In particular, there is no difference 
between invalidating an agency action at step one as opposed to step two. On the 
other hand, Bamberger and Strauss were right to observe that mandatoriness and 
reasonableness findings have distinct implications.21 Indeed, there is a very 
important difference between upholding an agency interpretation as mandatory or 
as reasonable: only the former bars future agency reinterpretations. Adding these 
insights together leads to a conclusion contrary to both pairs of commentators: 
traditional Chevron has two distinct steps that respectively ask whether the 
agency’s view is mandatory and whether it is reasonable. Contrary to Stephenson 
and Vermeule, each of the two steps does unique work. And, contrary to 
Bamberger and Strauss, neither step replicates the APA’s separate prohibition on 
arbitrary-and-capricious agency action. 
But if traditional Chevron does indeed have two distinct steps, it is fair to ask 
whether it should. On reflection, there are important advantages and disadvantages 
to traditional Chevron’s command that courts should ask about both mandatoriness 
and reasonableness in every case. For example, requiring courts to answer both 
questions facilitates the rapid development of the law, but asking only about 
reasonableness seems consistent with principles of judicial restraint. Instead of 
following traditional two-step, perhaps courts should ask only about 
reasonableness. Or perhaps courts should view Chevron as a discretionary decision 
procedure, such that they normally ask only about reasonableness but sometimes 
also ask about mandatoriness. In short, mandatoriness findings could be obligatory, 
prohibited, or discretionary. 
This tripartite menu of options has an analogue in qualified-immunity doctrine. 
In both contexts, courts have debated the virtues and vices of issuing helpful-but-
unnecessary decisions. In the qualified-immunity context, however, courts have 
settled on a discretionary decision procedure featuring an optional second step: 
courts first ask whether the government acted reasonably and then have the option 
to ask whether the government’s conduct was also lawful.22 A discretionary two-
step decision procedure also makes sense in the Chevron context. What is more, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See infra note 73 (quoting Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 613). 
 19. See infra note 66 (collecting sources). 
 20. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 835 (2010) 
(“Chevron thus has anywhere from one to four steps depending on what and how one counts. 
After twenty-five years, we should expect more clarity regarding the application of a 
framework doctrine like Chevron.”). 
 21. See infra note 70. 
 22. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). 
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examining qualified immunity helps shed light on how courts should exercise the 
discretion afforded them by optional two-step Chevron.  
The foregoing conclusions find support in an empirical review of current 
Chevron practice, including a survey of all published federal appellate decisions 
that cited Chevron in 2011. This research updates earlier studies and suggests that 
many courts already employ an optional two-step approach. 
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I addresses the logical structure of 
Chevron deference in order to assess the variety of ways in which the deference 
inquiry might be implemented. After discussing the dueling writings of Professors 
Stephenson and Vermeule and Bamberger and Strauss, this Part identifies “optional 
two-step” Chevron, whereby a court first asks whether the agency’s interpretation 
is reasonable and then has the option of asking the additional question whether the 
agency’s view is also mandatory. 
Part II considers the normative structure of Chevron deference—that is, the 
unavoidable but previously overlooked set of prescriptive issues that must dictate 
which version of Chevron ought to be adopted. Far from being practically 
interchangeable, each distinct version of Chevron deference has its own set of 
advantages and disadvantages. Traditional two-step fosters the rapid development 
of the law, whereas one-step accords with longstanding principles of judicial 
restraint. For its part, optional two-step has the advantage of paralleling the 
decision-making procedure now used in qualified-immunity cases. 
Part III then provides an empirical perspective by studying recent judicial 
practice in the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals. While each of the three 
logically available versions of Chevron finds precedential support, recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence generally implements the optional two-step approach. That is, 
the Court sometimes chooses to ask about both mandatoriness and reasonableness, 
but it more often asks only about reasonableness. The courts of appeals are 
similarly conflicted over the number of steps in the Chevron inquiry. These 
findings shed light on Chevron’s practical operation, along with the consequences 
of modifying the existing Chevron deference framework. 
Finally, the Conclusion offers a brief comment on the new doctrinal territory 
that optional two-step opens up. As noted, courts should exercise discretion in 
Chevron cases; and, more to the point, they already appear to be doing so. Yet the 
viability of that approach depends on the development of new doctrines that might 
guide, and thereby legitimize, courts’ exercise of their Chevron discretion. 
I. THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
Debates over the structure of Chevron often focus on descriptive or logical 
claims. Professors Stephenson and Vermeule offer a useful case in point, as even 
their title—“Chevron Has Only One Step”—suppresses normative considerations. 
This Part discusses the leading works on the structure of Chevron deference. In 
particular, this Part takes up the one-step version of Chevron advocated by 
Stephenson and Vermeule, as well as the distinct version of Chevron propounded 
by Professors Bamberger and Strauss. Through an analysis of these competing 
proposals, this Part establishes a new, clearer understanding of the logical options 
available. Once this groundwork is accomplished, it will become possible to 
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evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of competing formulations of the Chevron 
inquiry, each of which offers a substantively different deference regime. 
A. Traditional Chevron Has Two Distinct Steps 
Stephenson and Vermeule rest their case on a single claim: that steps one and 
two of the traditional two-step Chevron inquiry are formally identical and therefore 
redundant.23 When two propositions are formally identical, it is illogical to think 
they are different, or to treat them differently. The claim that steps one and two are 
identical thus provides a powerful basis for critique. If Stephenson and Vermeule 
are correct, then any differentiation between Chevron’s two steps would be a 
logical error—a confusion, by definition. We should not abide an “artificial 
division of one inquiry into two.”24 
Stephenson and Vermeule take as their principal target judges and scholars who 
think that Chevron’s two steps address different questions of statutory 
interpretation.25 The authors particularly have in mind people who “believe that 
Step One requires them to ascertain whether the statute has a single, clear meaning 
before deciding whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.”26 Of course, the 
Supreme Court’s actual decision in Chevron said precisely that. But Stephenson 
and Vermeule think that the Court misspoke—as it must have done if Chevron’s 
two steps were actually identical. Stephenson and Vermeule acknowledge their 
revisionist ambition in so many words: “Sometimes judges write watershed 
opinions whose deep logic only gradually becomes clear and whose language fails 
to capture that deep logic.”27 The remainder of this Part argues that Chevron’s 
actual “language” captures its “logic” more effectively than does the one-step 
approach proposed by Stephenson and Vermeule. 
There are three possible outcomes in every case involving judicial deference to 
an agency interpretation: (i) the statute clearly means what the agency says, (ii) the 
statute is ambiguous as to what the agency says, or (iii) the statute is clearly 
contrary to what the agency says. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See, e.g., Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 597 (“Chevron, properly 
understood, has only one step.”); id. at 599 (“[T]he two Chevron steps both ask this question, 
just in different ways. As a result, the two steps are mutually convertible.”); id. at 609 
(“Judges and scholars could simplify matters, at no collateral cost, by recognizing that 
Chevron . . . has only one step.”). 
 24. Id. at 597–98. 
 25. Id. at 605–06. The U.S. Solicitor General recently offered a succinct statement of the 
traditional view that Chevron calls for an interpretive exercise at both steps. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 34–35, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11-1545) 
(Solicitor General Verrilli: “Step 1 of Chevron . . . of course . . . us[es] the normal tools of 
statutory construction,” and “Step Two of Chevron . . . asks whether the agency’s 
interpretation of the provision at issue . . . [is] within the bounds of what the language can 
reasonably accommodate . . . [.]”). 
 26. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 605. 
 27. Id. at 609 (arguing that “there is no need for courts and scholars to cling to the 
original language of” Chevron). 
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The two-stage decision procedure that the Supreme Court described in Chevron 
ensures that courts consider each of the three foregoing options. At step one, the 
court asks if Congress “has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” 
thereby either adopting or ruling out the agency’s position.28 If Congress has 
directly addressed the question at issue, then the court must further determine 
whether the agency’s views accord with the clear “intent of Congress.”29 And if 
Congress has not directly addressed the relevant question, then the court goes on to 
step two and asks if the agency’s position “is based on a permissible 
construction.”30 
Traditional two-step Chevron thus asks two questions, each with two possible 
answers (yes/no). That approach creates a certain degree of redundancy. Two 
questions, each with two possible answers, leaves room for four possible outcomes 
defined by a two-by-two matrix. Yet only three actual deference options exist. The 
diagram below depicts the four possible pairs of answers created by applying 
traditional two-step Chevron (i.e., yes/yes, yes/no, no/yes, and no/no), along with 
the fact that there are only three substantive results available at the inquiry’s 














Figure 1. Traditional Two-Step Chevron. 
 
The redundancy is easily located. A yes/yes pair of answers means that the 
agency’s reading is mandatory: Congress has spoken directly, and the agency’s 
view accords with Congress’s direction. A yes/no pair means that the agency’s 
view should be overturned for defying Congress’s specific resolution of the 
relevant issue. And a no/yes pair means that the agency’s view is permissible in 
light of Congress’s silence and so warrants deference. Those pairs of answers 
describe all of the three possible outcomes in agency deference cases. 
Yet the traditional two-step framework leaves open the possibility of a fourth 
possible pair: no/no, where the agency’s reading survives step one but is 
nonetheless impermissible at step two. That scenario, which is shaded in the 
diagram above, is materially indistinguishable from the aforementioned yes/no pair. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 29. Id. 
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In both cases, something about the statute is both clear and inconsistent with the 
agency’s view. In other words, any judicial decision to invalidate agency action as 
a yes/no at step one can be recharacterized as a no/no decision at step two. 
This is where the critique offered by Stephenson and Vermeule has force: a 
yes/no pair under two-step Chevron really is logically indistinguishable from a 
no/no pair. The Supreme Court was therefore correct to say, as quoted in 
Stephenson and Vermeule’s paper, that “if Congress has directly spoken to an issue 
[at step one] then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said 
would be unreasonable [at step two].”31 To that limited extent, it is accurate to say 
that traditional two-step Chevron, as articulated by the Supreme Court, contains a 
redundancy. 
Stephenson and Vermeule capitalize on the limited redundancy present in 
traditional two-step Chevron by picking examples that showcase that point. Near 
the opening of their essay, for example, the authors state that “the two Chevron 
steps both ask [the same] question, just in different ways” and therefore “are 
mutually convertible.”32 Stephenson and Vermeule then describe two cases—FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.33 and Goldstein v. SEC34—in which courts 
struck down agency interpretations under step one and step two, respectively. 
Stephenson and Vermeule assert that these examples prove that “Step One and Step 
Two opinions are always mutually convertible.”35 But that conclusion is incorrect. 
The examples chosen by Stephenson and Vermeule instead prove, at most, that 
yes/no and no/no pairs are interchangeable, as indicated by the above diagram. The 
purported interchangeability of Chevron’s two steps evaporates in cases where 
agency interpretation is upheld: yes/yes pairs lead to findings that the agency’s 
reading is mandatory, whereas no/yes pairs produce the very different result that 
the agency’s reading is reasonable. Revealingly, Stephenson and Vermeule’s 
interchangeability examples do not include a judicial decision upholding an agency 
interpretation.36 Had the authors introduced such an example, they would have 
confronted the difference between step-one and step-two holdings. 
What happens when Chevron is reduced to only one step? The one-step version 
of Chevron that Stephenson and Vermeule propose is essentially the same verbal 
formulation as step two.37 And the authors express their conclusion by saying that 
step one is unnecessary. So it appears that the one-step version of Chevron 
proposed by Stephenson and Vermeule, like step two, has only two possible 
answers, either yes or no. To repeat the key sentence from Stephenson and 
Vermeule’s essay: “The single question is whether the agency’s construction is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 597 (quoting Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009)). 
 32. Id. at 599. 
 33. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 34. 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 35. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 600. 
 36. For another example of this pattern in Stephenson and Vermeule’s essay, see infra 
note 40 and accompanying text. 
 37. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 605. 
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permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation . . . .”38 A question that uses the 
word “whether” in this way normally has only “yes” or “no” as possible answers. 
That leads to a serious problem, however. A single question with two possible 
answers cannot possibly capture the full range of answers available in deference 
cases. Again, there are three potential answers in all agency deference cases: the 
agency’s interpretation may be mandatory, it may be reasonable, or it may be 
impermissible. Because one-step Chevron can be answered in only two ways (yes 
or no), it cannot capture one of the three possible answers in agency deference 
cases. 
So Stephenson and Vermeule are faced with a choice. They can either give up 
on their claim that two-step and one-step Chevron are analytically identical, or they 
must say that one-step Chevron has three possible answers. Given that their entire 
critique hangs on the proposition that one-step and two-step Chevron are 
interchangeable, Stephenson and Vermeule would presumably adopt the latter of 
these options. 
But if Stephenson and Vermeule take the view that one-step Chevron has three 
possible answers, then they would not have simplified the traditional two-step 
approach. Again, a “whether” question like one-step Chevron invites two possible 
options, either yes or no. For a “whether” question to permit three options, it must 
be accompanied by some other principle specifying the full range of possibilities. 
That is, Stephenson and Vermeule cannot rest after having asked their purportedly 
solitary question: “whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of 
statutory interpretation.”39 Rather, they must then ask a follow-up question: “Also, 
please consider whether the agency’s construction is mandatory.” Ironically, “one-
step” Chevron can function as intended only with the help of a second step.40 
In sum, those who hope to capture the full range of options in deference cases 
do not face a choice between two redundant steps and a single elegant step, as 
Stephenson and Vermeule would have it. The choice is instead between: (i) two 
questions, each with yes or no as options; and (ii) one question with yes or no as 
options, accompanied by a separate direction to consider another yes or no 
question. A moment’s reflection reveals that (i) and (ii) are substantively identical. 
And both have two steps. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Id. at 599. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Deviating from Stephenson and Vermeule’s framework, one might suggest that 
traditional Chevron’s two steps should be fused together, thereby creating a single, three-
option question. In effect, this version of Chevron would ask: “Is the agency’s interpretation 
reasonable, unreasonable, or mandatory?” But any two-step procedure can be rewritten as a 
one-step question with a menu of options, and the availability of a multipart question hardly 
demonstrates that a two-step procedure would be redundant. 
  Imagine, for example, you want to know whether visitors to the Land of Oz are good 
witches and, if they aren’t, whether they are wicked or not witches at all. You might then 
adopt a two-step procedure: first, ask whether a particular visitor—say, Dorothy—is a witch; 
if yes, then further ask whether Dorothy is wicked. Clearly, each step of that procedure does 
unique work. Yet the two-step procedure is equivalent to asking the single, multipart 
question whether Dorothy is a wicked witch, a good witch, or not a witch at all. The single, 
multipart question hardly qualifies as a simplifying improvement. Just so with Chevron. 
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B. The Additional Step Is Important  
We have already seen that the traditional two-step approach to Chevron ensures 
consideration of all three possible answers to deference questions. By contrast, one-
step Chevron must be complemented by an additional question in order to ensure 
consideration of the full range of possible answers. To the extent that Stephenson 
and Vermeule have not accepted or made clear the need for this separate step, they 
risk truncating, instead of simplifying, the traditional Chevron inquiry.41 
After outlining the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable agency 
interpretations, Stephenson and Vermeule confront the exact position advocated 
here: “We might distinguish Step One and Step Two by interpreting Step One to 
ask whether Congress has clearly specified one, and only one, permissible 
interpretation of the statute.”42 Quite so. That is just another way of saying—as 
argued above—that step one asks whether the agency’s interpretation is mandatory, 
apart from whether it is reasonable or unreasonable. Stephenson and Vermeule 
should leap at their own suggestion. 
Instead, the authors reject that straightforward conclusion—as they must in 
order to advance their thesis that having a second step does no additional work. 
How can they do this? In short, by denying that the additional step matters. 
Stephenson and Vermeule first explain that “Congress’ intention may be 
ambiguous within a range, but not at all ambiguous as to interpretations outside that 
range, which are clearly forbidden”; and they further note that statutes can be open 
to a “range of reasonable interpretations,” thereby giving rise to “‘policy space’ 
within which agencies may make reasoned choices.”43 Having reiterated those 
uncontroversial observations, Stephenson and Vermeule conclude: “There is 
therefore no good reason why we should decide whether the statute has only one 
possible reading before deciding simply whether the agency’s interpretation falls 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Arguing in a similar vein, Professors Bamberger and Strauss briefly suggested that, 
“[t]o the extent” one-step Chevron preserves what this Article calls mandatoriness findings, 
its “proposed doctrinal change” would be “merely a semantic one.” Bamberger & Strauss, 
supra note 15, at 617. However, Bamberger and Strauss immediately minimized the 
importance of mandatoriness findings by asserting that they are rare. See id. at 615–16 
(stating that judicial interpretations that “precisely map[] a singular congressional intent on 
the issue at hand” are of “lesser interest in our judgment, given the rarity of point judgments 
by Congress, particularly in the context of administrative law”). That point tended to support 
one-step Chevron, since the alleged rarity of mandatoriness holdings suggests that little 
would be lost by dropping the mandatoriness question from the Chevron inquiry. 
  Bamberger and Strauss primarily argued against one-step Chevron on the ground 
that courts applying that approach might sometimes give the mistaken impression of having 
made mandatoriness holdings. See id. at 617–21; id. at 618 (arguing that “a court that . . . 
concludes only that an agency interpretation passes muster . . . is permitted a sort of 
aggrandizement by implication” in that it “may invite the inference that its holding 
constitutes a precedential Step One analysis”). But any potential confusion on that score 
could easily be dispelled by making clear that one-step Chevron asks only about 
reasonableness and therefore renders mandatoriness findings impossible. 
 42. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 602 (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id. 
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into the range of permissible interpretations.”44 Taking the absolutist line necessary 
to defend their essay’s thesis, to say nothing of its pithy title, Stephenson and 
Vermeule assert that “nothing of consequence turns on whether the set of 
permissible interpretations has one element or more than one element; the only 
question is whether the agency’s interpretation is in that set or not.” 45 
That last statement, read literally, is incorrect. What Stephenson and Vermeule 
presumably mean is that whether the agency wins doesn’t turn on “whether the set 
of permissible interpretations has one element or more,” so long as “the agency’s 
interpretation is in that set.”46 That narrower statement would be true enough. But 
as the authors elsewhere recognize,47 it is a mistake to think that “nothing of 
consequence turns on whether the set of permissible interpretations has one element 
or more than one element.”48 If a court says that the “set of permissible 
interpretations has one element”49 while upholding an agency interpretation, then it 
has made what is normally called a “step-one holding.”50 It has bound the agency to 
adhere to its reading henceforth, no matter what the expert agency might later 
discover and come what may in the upcoming election cycle. By contrast, if the 
court says that “the set of permissible interpretations has”—or may have—“more 
than one element,”51 then the agency remains free to seek out and adopt another 
element in the set. Whether an agency is constrained by its own success marks the 
critical difference between a reading that is mandatory and one that is reasonable. 
We can be more specific. Both step-one and step-two rulings in favor of 
agencies demonstrate that the agency’s view is at least reasonable. But step-one 
rulings mean something more—namely, that all other views of the relevant issue 
are unreasonable. In other words, a step-one holding in favor of an agency consists 
of a reasonableness finding (as to the agency’s view) plus an unreasonableness 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Id. Viewed in isolation, this sentence could be read to pertain only to the timing of 
the two steps; that is, the sentence could mean that there is no reason to ask whether the 
agency’s reading is mandatory “before” asking whether it is reasonable. Id. But surely there 
is a difference between asking both of those questions and asking only one of them. In other 
words, there is a difference between asking (at step one) if the agency’s reading of the statute 
is mandatory and asking (at step two) if the agency’s reading is reasonable. Stephenson and 
Vermeule are wrong to insist that we lose nothing by asking only the second question. 
Further, the timing of the two steps may actually be important as well. See infra Part II. 
 45. Id.; see also id. at 609 (asserting that adopting one-step Chevron would come at “no 
collateral cost”). 
 46. Id. at 602. 
 47. Id. at 605–06 (“[T]he more judges are inclined to declare that a statute has one and 
only one meaning, the harder it will be for future agencies to adopt alternative constructions 
of the same statute that the initial court did not anticipate.”); see also Bamberger & Strauss, 
supra note 15, at 616 (“[A] judicial precedent holding that a particular interpretation is either 
required or precluded fixes statutory meaning to that extent, foreclosing future agency 
constructions to the contrary.”). 
 48. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 602 (emphasis added). 
 49. Id. 
 50. E.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 193 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“The Supreme Court's decision in [Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995)] is a classic 
Chevron step one holding” because the agency’s view was upheld as “not ambiguous.”). 
 51. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 602. 
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finding (as to all other views). That additional, prohibitory conclusion does not 
arise when a court affirmatively responds to the question, “Is the agency’s view 
permissible?” When a court affirms an agency interpretation for being reasonable, 
it thereby postpones the mandatoriness inquiry, perhaps indefinitely. Once again, a 
defining feature of traditional two-step Chevron is its insistence that courts find 
agency interpretations to be mandatory whenever possible. In sharp contrast, one-
step Chevron would forgo those findings by asking only whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable. 
Besides having obvious practical importance for judicial and agency decision-
making, the difference between mandatory and reasonable readings also goes to 
one of Chevron’s core purposes: fostering political accountability.52 Under one-step 
Chevron, courts would hold agency interpretations to be reasonable without 
clarifying whether they are mandatory. Those holdings would obscure whether 
responsibility for the agency policy lies most immediately with the Executive or 
with Congress. Consider interpretations offered by non-independent, executive-
branch agencies over which the President has considerable influence, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). When the agency interprets a federal 
statute, interested parties will very much want to know whether that interpretation 
was mandatory or reasonable. If it was mandatory, then interested groups must seek 
relief in the halls of Congress. But if the agency’s interpretation was only 
reasonable, then aggrieved parties might prefer to visit the White House first. 
Mandatory readings are also integral to implementation of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Brand X53 that judicial interpretations of statutes subsequently bind 
agencies only if the reviewing court specifies that its interpretation was 
unambiguous.54 In a footnote, Stephenson and Vermeule argue that Brand X would 
be unaffected by one-step Chevron, but in making this claim they once again 
overlook cases that involve a prior agency victory.55 According to the authors, “if 
the prior court stated clearly that the agency’s (current) interpretation was outside 
the zone of the permissible, then the agency may not now adopt that 
interpretation.”56 Having thus narrowed their gaze to cases involving invalidation 
of agency action, Stephenson and Vermeule conclude: “nothing in the logical 
structure of the inquiry requires a distinction between cases in which the zone of 
the permissible reduces to a single point, and cases in which it does not—the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 
(1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, 
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy 
choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not 
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency . . . .”). 
 53. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 
(2005) (explaining that “a precedent holding a statute to be unambiguous forecloses a 
contrary agency construction” (citing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996))). 
 54. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 616 (making this point, albeit without 
distinguishing cases involving agency victories from defeats). 
 55. As discussed in Part I, inadequate attention to agency victories also underlies 
Stephenson and Vermeule’s overbroad claim that the two steps are always interchangeable. 
See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 56. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 606 n.32. 
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distinction at the heart of the current two-step framework.”57 But what if the prior 
court had held at step one that the agency’s earlier interpretation was mandatory—
in other words, that “the zone of the permissible reduces to a single point”?58 In that 
event, the agency would have been limited as to future interpretations. In pointed 
contrast, the agency would not be so limited if the prior court had issued only a 
one-step holding pertaining to reasonableness alone. 
For all these reasons, Stephenson and Vermeule are wrong to claim that “the 
only question is whether the agency’s interpretation is in that set,” that is, the set of 
reasonable readings, “or not.”59 Perhaps that is the only question that we should 
ask, but it is not the only available or important question in agency deference cases. 
Traditional two-step asks the additional, highly significant question of whether the 
agency’s reading is mandatory. 
C. How to Cure Traditional Chevron’s Redundancy 
We saw earlier that traditional two-step Chevron generates a limited 
redundancy. To summarize: asking the two successive questions that make up 
traditional two-step Chevron, where each question is susceptible to two answers, 
yields four possible outcomes. Yet there are only three possible answers in 
deference cases: mandatory, reasonable, and unreasonable. The redundancy arises 
when agency interpretations are held to be unreasonable—an outcome that is 
equally available at either step one or step two. 
Fortunately, this limited redundancy can be cured. The simplest way to do so is 
to tweak step one so that it focuses on the unique work made possible by that 
step—namely, finding agency interpretations to be mandatory.60 To implement that 
tweak, courts engaged in step one might ask “[w]hether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue” in a way that mandates the reading offered 
by the agency?61 Or, even more simply: “Is the agency’s reading mandatory?” If 
no, then step two would follow without modification. 
Under this revision, there would be three possible outcomes: yes, no/yes, and 
no/no. And each outcome would lead to a unique, non-duplicative answer. A yes 
outcome would mean that the agency’s view is mandatory. A no/yes outcome 
would mean that the agency’s view is reasonable. And a no/no outcome would 
mean that the agency’s view is unreasonable. This revision is consistent with the 
Court’s statement in Chevron that, “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter.”62 And it also accords with the common practice of referring to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 602. 
 60. Another solution would be to ask (at step one) whether the agency’s view is 
reasonable and (at step two) whether the agency’s reading is mandatory. In other words, step 
one might ask whether the agency’s reading is consistent with the statute. If no, then the 
agency would lose, and the inquiry would end. If yes, then an obligatory, non-optional step 
two would ask if the agency’s view is also mandatory. Cf. infra note 125. 
 61. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 62. Id. 
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mandatoriness findings as “step-one” holdings.63 Below, Figure 2 illustrates this 










Figure 2. Revised Traditional Two-Step. 
 
In order to focus attention on the unique work being done at step one, the 
remainder of this Article will adopt the above tweak. Again, this revision calls for 
courts to ask at step one, “Is the agency’s reading mandatory?” Courts would then 
ask the same step-two question that doubles as one-step Chevron, “Is the agency’s 
reading permissible?” 
D. The Possibility of an Optional Two-Step Procedure 
So far, we have seen that traditional Chevron is defined in part by having two 
steps, each of which does unique and important interpretive work. Asking whether 
an agency interpretation is both mandatory (step one) and reasonable (step two) 
reveals more information than just asking about either mandatoriness or 
reasonableness alone. 
But traditional two-step Chevron has another defining feature: it makes 
mandatoriness findings, well, mandatory. That is the effect of requiring 
consideration of both steps in every case. Under traditional two-step Chevron, there 
is no way to reach the second step (on reasonableness) without previously 
considering at the first step whether Congress has spoken directly to the 
interpretive question in a way that would preclude later agency re-interpretation. 
One-step Chevron actually rules out the possibility of mandatoriness findings. 
When asked, “Is the agency’s view permissible,” courts implementing one-step 
Chevron will answer “yes” and thereby terminate the case, even when the real 
answer is, “Not only is it permissible, it’s mandatory.”64 Put another way, two-step 
Chevron makes mandatoriness findings obligatory, whereas one-step Chevron 
makes mandatoriness findings impermissible. 
There is a third, intermediate option. Instead of being either obligatory or 
impermissible, mandatoriness findings could be optional. The essential deference 
question, after all, is the question of reasonableness. If the agency is reasonable, it 
wins. And if it is unreasonable, it loses. By contrast, the mandatoriness question is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See supra note 50. 
 64. Saying that an interpretation is “mandatory” means more than saying that it is the 
“best” interpretation. When the best reading is also the only reasonable one, then it is 
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expendable: it is important only because of the useful information it reveals for 
future decision making by litigants, administrators, courts, and legislators. 
The third potential version of the Chevron inquiry can be termed “optional two-
step.” Importantly, this previously unidentified approach would reverse the order of 
the traditional two steps. That is, optional two-step Chevron would first ask the 
reasonableness question, and then it would give courts discretion to ask a second 
question regarding mandatoriness. This reversed sequence helpfully prioritizes the 
indispensable and easier inquiry into reasonableness, while postponing the optional, 
harder question of mandatoriness. The advantages and disadvantages of optional 
two-step Chevron are discussed at length in Part II below. 
E. On Equating Step Two with Arbitrariness Review 
At first blush, the analysis provided above might seem like a defense of the 
conventional wisdom regarding Chevron, which holds that Chevron deference has 
two steps. But the above analysis actually goes against the grain of administrative 
case law and scholarship. 
Many commentators,65 with abundant precedential support,66 offer a picture of 
Chevron wherein only step one concerns statutory interpretation as such. Step two, 
by contrast, is said to entail the requirement of rational explanation codified in 
section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).67 Professors Kenneth 
Bamberger and Peter L. Strauss exemplify this view.68 As noted above,69 
Bamberger and Strauss helpfully distinguish between reasonableness and 
mandatoriness findings, but they argue that both of those inquiries are encompassed 
within step one.70 At step two, by contrast, “Section 706(2) of the [APA] sets the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 621 n.39 (describing this view as 
reflecting an “emerging consensus”); supra note 16 (distinguishing the traditional view). 
 66. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (“[U]nder Chevron step 
two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils Bd., 525 
U.S. 366, 391–92 (1999); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 1234, 1235 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he second step of Chevron . . . overlaps with the arbitrary and 
capricious standard”); supra note 4. 
 67. As Bamberger and Strauss are careful to note, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., 
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983), does not exhaust the range of 
factors relevant when testing agency interpretations under the APA, even though “State 
Farm’s inquiry into consideration of relevant regulatory factors and explanation based on 
record evidence certainly plays a significant role in determining the appropriateness of many 
agency interpretations.” Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 622; see also id. at 625 
(“While the statutory language defining [the step two] inquiry is the same language that 
governed State Farm, the emphasis may vary.”). 
 68. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 602–04, 624–25; see also Peter L. 
Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore 
Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1162 (2012) (“Step two, thus seen, is merely what 
section 706(2)(A) of the APA commands.”); Levin, supra note 4. 
 69. See text accompanying supra note 21; supra note 41. 
 70. When articulating step one, Bamberger and Strauss even use a sentence with a 
tripartite “either . . . or . . . or” construction. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 624 
(“At Chevron’s first step, courts reviewing administrative constructions should begin by 
620 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:605 
 
general standard.”71 Thus, an agency would fail arbitrariness review at step two if it 
arrived at a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, but did so for 
arbitrary and capricious reasons.72 On this view, step one is concerned with all 
substantive questions of statutory interpretation, whereas step two is occupied with 
the fundamentally procedural question of adequate explanation.73 
However, any attempt to equate step two with arbitrariness review encounters a 
significant logical problem: it shoehorns consideration of two substantively distinct 
issues—reasonableness and mandatoriness—into a purportedly singular first 
“step.” The familiar term “Chevron step one” thus becomes a misnomer. To solve 
this difficulty, the vision of Chevron propounded by Bamberger and Strauss might 
be relabeled “three-step Chevron.” This new label would reflect that, for 
Bamberger and Strauss, the Chevron inquiry encompasses three distinct 
questions—namely, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, mandatory, 
and rationally explained.74 
But does three-step Chevron really offer a distinct way to structure the deference 
inquiry? Table 1 explores this question by schematizing the role that section 706(2) 
plays under three approaches: traditional two-step Chevron, the three-step version 











                                                                                                                 
identifying whether congressional instructions clearly either require or preclude the choice 
the agency has made or, instead, whether the agency’s choice falls within a range of 
possibilities permitted by language that Congress has left ambiguous.”) (emphases added). 
This single question with a tripartite menu of options (mandatory, unreasonable, reasonable) 
can easily be rewritten as traditional two-step Chevron. See supra note 40. 
 71. Id. at 625. 
 72. Agencies can articulate unlawfully arbitrary reasons on the way toward arriving at 
substantively reasonable statutory interpretations. For example, an agency could simply flip 
a coin, and then, by happenstance, arrive at a defensible conclusion. See State Farm, 463 
U.S. at 43 (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, [or] entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .”). Bamberger and Strauss supply the 
example of an agency that erroneously “construed a prior judicial construction to mean that 
the statute could bear only one particular meaning.” Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 
622. 
 73. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 613 (distinguishing between “the 
‘interpretive question’ (involving the permissibility of an agency construction in light of 
statutory language) and the ‘decisionmaking question’ (regarding the reasonableness of the 
process by which a permissible construction was reached)” and concluding: “We would 
simply call these [two questions] ‘Step One’ and ‘Step Two.’”). 
 74. Courts have sometimes followed such a three-step approach. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 335–39 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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Chevron Step One: 
Is the Agency’s 
reading mandatory? 
 
Chevron Step Two: 




Chevron Step One: 
(i) Is the Agency’s 
reading mandatory? 
(ii) Is the Agency’s 
reading reasonable? 
One-Step Chevron: 
Is the Agency’s 
reading reasonable?  
Arbitrariness Review: 
Is the Agency’s 
reading arbitrary 
under section 706 of 
the APA? 
 
Chevron Step Two: 
Is the Agency’s  
reading arbitrary  
under section 706 of  
the APA? 
Arbitrariness Review: 
Is the Agency’s 
reading arbitrary  




The bottom three cells are shaded because they are all substantively identical. 
The table thus indicates that the same APA review for rational decision making will 
take place under all three of the above-listed versions of Chevron. The only point of 
dispute is what that mode of review will be called. Under both traditional two-step 
and one-step Chevron, it is called “arbitrariness review.” Under the three-step 
version propounded by Bamberger and Strauss, by contrast, the same analytical 
inquiry is called “Chevron step two.” 
The top three cells are more diverse. Moving from left to right, traditional two-
step cleanly divides the distinct mandatoriness and reasonableness questions into 
two discrete steps. By contrast, three-step Chevron squeezes these two questions 
into the “step one” label, and so—as noted above—uses that term in a way that is 
misleading to the point of being inaccurate. Further, by compressing the 
mandatoriness and reasonableness questions into a single “step,” Bamberger and 
Strauss obscure the important issue of whether both questions must be asked in 
every case.75 The top right cell is in a category by itself. By eliminating the 
mandatoriness question entirely, one-step would substantively revise the traditional 
two-step Chevron deference inquiry. 
As Table 1 illustrates, there is no substantive difference between traditional two-
step and the three-step version of Chevron put forward by Bamberger and Strauss. 
And, as Stephenson and Vermeule pointed out, arbitrariness review also takes place 
under one-step Chevron.76 The view advanced by Bamberger and Strauss is 
therefore distinctive primarily in its terminology.77 Instead of discussing three-step 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. See also supra note 41. If Bamberger and Strauss did not require courts to ask both 
questions at step one, then their view would be substantively identical to optional two-step, 
discussed below. 
 76. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 603–04 (likewise arguing that any 
attempt to equate step two with arbitrariness review would be “superfluous” with State Farm 
and the APA). 
 77. Bamberger and Strauss also defend their approach by contending that it accords with 
the weight of precedent. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 621. But, as argued 
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as a distinct option, we can simply remember that any version of Chevron 
deference must be accompanied by arbitrariness review.78 
Bamberger and Strauss also draw a methodological distinction between the two 
steps. In particular, they contend that step two is the proper home of normative 
canons, such as the canon of constitutional avoidance.79 But, as Bamberger has 
separately acknowledged, the Supreme Court appears to have rejected that view: at 
step one, courts are to use all the “traditional tools of statutory construction,”80 
including the avoidance canon.81 In any event, starting with the question of 
interpretive methods cannot help us discern the proper structure of the Chevron 
inquiry. Instead, we need to identify and distinguish the available interpretive 
questions before we decide what interpretive tools to use in answering those 
questions. For example, Bamberger and Strauss may be correct that, when fixing 
statutory meaning, courts should not rely on certain interpretive tools.82 But that 
methodological claim cannot tell us whether or when to fix statutory meanings 
through mandatoriness findings. If anything, attention to interpretive methods 
actually increases the importance of clearly distinguishing between mandatoriness 
and reasonableness findings, since different interpretive methods may be 
appropriate as to each of those questions. 
                                                                                                                 
below, that claim is overstated. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. For more on 
Bamberger and Strauss, see supra note 41. 
 78. While courts might apply arbitrariness review somewhat differently if it were 
formally incorporated into Chevron, there is no obvious reason either why that would be so 
or whether such a disparity would be desirable. Compare Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 
15, at 625 (noting that, when applying arbitrariness review as part of Chevron, the “focus 
may be on interpretive method, as opposed to the fact-intensive judgments at issue in State 
Farm”), with Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 606 (“[I]f judges interpret Step Two 
as imposing a reasoned decisionmaking requirement that strongly resembles State Farm . . . 
the result may be an unjustified departure from the standard approach to hard look review in 
the statutory interpretation context.”). 
 79. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 623–24; see also Kenneth A. 
Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 
64, 66–69 (2008). Bamberger and Strauss also suggest that legislative history may be 
considered only at step two, see Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 623–24, even 
though legislative history (for those who use it) is clearly a traditional tool of statutory 
construction. 
 80. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984); see also Bamberger, supra note 79, at 64; id. at 77 (“The largest group of cases to 
consider the place of normative canons in review of agency interpretations treats them as the 
type of ‘traditional tools’ that courts may use to resolve textual ambiguity . . . .”); id. at 77–
78 nn.40–45 (citing Supreme Court cases). 
 81. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 
(2001); Edward J. DeBarolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 577 (1988); see also Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F. 3d 1237, 1250 
(10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.). But see Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative 
Canons in the Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of 
Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139 (2012). 
 82. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 15, at 624 (arguing that substantive canons 
should be confined to step two in part because those canons “should not fix statutory 
meaning but rather leave a range of interpretive authority in agency hands”); Bamberger, 
supra note 79, at 114–23. 
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In sum, debating the appropriate label for arbitrariness review cannot help us 
determine what the statutory deference inquiry ought to be. The proper structure of 
Chevron deference must instead turn on a substantive question—namely, whether 
mandatoriness findings should be impermissible, obligatory, or optional. 
F. The Three Distinct Versions of Chevron 
It is time to take stock. From what has been shown so far, we know that no 
single version of the agency deference inquiry is logically compelled. Rather, there 
are several different analytic regimes traveling under the name Chevron. 
First, “traditional two-step” asks initially whether the statute is clear and then 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. To clarify and sharpen this 
approach,83 step one can be understood to ask, “Is the agency’s reading 
mandatory?” 
Second, “optional two-step” asks whether the agency’s reading is reasonable 
and then gives courts discretion to ask whether the agency’s interpretation is not 
just reasonable, but mandatory. 
Finally, “one-step” asks only whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable 
and never asks whether the agency’s view is mandatory. These three versions of 
Chevron are outlined in the table below.84 
 





Optional Two-Step One-Step 
 
1. Is the Agency’s 
reading mandatory? 
 
2. Is the Agency’s 
reading reasonable? 
 
1. Is the Agency’s  
reading reasonable? 
 




1. Is the Agency’s 
reading reasonable?  
 
So what we have is not a logically compelled choice, as Stephenson and 
Vermeule would have it, but rather a normative decision. Chevron comes in three 
distinct varieties, and we have to ask: Which option should we prefer? 
II. THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
Having now arrived at a clear understanding of how courts might logically 
structure Chevron, it is time to ask the normative question of how Chevron should 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. See supra Part I.C. 
 84. Someone who subscribed to the view offered by Professors Bamberger and 
Strauss—that is, someone who thought that step two entailed arbitrariness review—might 
view all three versions of Chevron outlined in Table 2 as alternative ways of implementing 
step one. By contrast, someone who wished to keep Chevron and State Farm distinct would 
view the arbitrariness review established by the APA as an additional analysis undertaken 
apart from the three versions of Chevron listed in Table 2. See supra Part I.D. 
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be structured. This analysis must proceed over nearly uncharted ground. Despite all 
the articles on the proper structure of Chevron, normative considerations have 
played only a peripheral role—even as descriptive and logical arguments abound.85 
As discussed below, each of the different versions of Chevron has its own strengths 
and weaknesses. To focus the analysis, this Part develops a novel analogy to 
qualified-immunity doctrine, which has likewise struggled with the question of 
whether unnecessary lawmaking should be impermissible, obligatory, or optional. 
On balance, the qualified-immunity analogy cuts in favor of optional two-step. 
However, the normative case for optional two-step may depend on the development 
of new rules capable of guiding and legitimizing courts’ exercise of their 
previously unrecognized Chevron discretion. 
A. Beginning to Assess the Options 
The obvious strength of traditional two-step Chevron is that it fosters rapid 
development of the law. Courts that apply traditional two-step always ask, at step 
one, whether the statute is clear. Therefore, traditional two-step always discloses 
when an agency’s reading is mandatory. And discovering that an agency’s position 
is not just acceptable but necessary is a huge help—to litigants, to courts, and to the 
agency itself. How many business decisions, lawsuits, executive-branch lobbying 
efforts, and agency deliberations could be spared by finding out early whether an 
agency’s interpretation is obligated by law? All other things being equal, it is 
plainly much more efficient to clarify the law sooner rather than later.86 
But all other things might not be equal.87 Perhaps resolving issues of statutory 
meaning sooner rather than later will generate inefficient decision making and even 
error. Restraint may be especially warranted in the Chevron context, because the 
question whether an agency’s view is mandatory may not be squarely addressed, 
either by the government or by its challengers. The outcome of any particular 
agency challenge, after all, will turn only on whether the agency’s reading is 
impermissible, regardless of whether it is mandatory. Thus, there is normally no 
need to take up the potentially difficult and time-consuming question of 
mandatoriness. It may therefore be preferable for courts to postpone ruling out 
potential agency constructions until they are adopted by the government and 
squarely challenged as unreasonable. 
There are also legitimacy problems associated with traditional two-step 
Chevron. A supporter of one-step Chevron might point out, for example, that it is 
unnecessary in agency deference cases to find that the agency’s reading is not just 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Normative considerations have appeared more saliently in arguments for 
abandoning Chevron deference. See, e.g., supra note 20; infra note 128. 
 86. Similar points are sometimes made regarding unnecessary holdings in the 
alternative. See, e.g., Karsten v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 36 F.3d 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(“Thus, from the perspective of judicial economy, alternative holdings are a welcome 
blessing for courts at all levels.”); see also infra notes 102, 119 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Karsten, 36 F.3d at 11 (“[A]lternative holdings also provide courts, 
particularly appellate courts reviewing alternative holdings below, with the tempting 
opportunity to stray into the practice of advisory opinion-making, solving questions that do 
not actually require answering in order to resolve the matters before them.”). 
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reasonable but mandatory.88 And, in the language of contemporary judicial 
restraint, when it is not necessary to decide, it is necessary not to decide.89 For the 
same reasons that courts typically eschew unnecessarily broad holdings and refuse 
to afford precedential effect to dicta,90 they might also disfavor the unnecessary 
lawmaking that marks traditional two-step Chevron. 
Is optional two-step Chevron the best of both worlds? It certainly does allow 
courts to clarify the law by finding agency interpretations to be mandatory, as 
opposed to reasonable. Whether that choice is viewed as a plus or a minus largely 
depends on whether courts are likely to choose wisely. When a court opts to find an 
agency reading mandatory, it has either helpfully clarified the law or rashly erred. 
And if a court simply finds the agency’s reading to be reasonable, without reaching 
the question of whether the reading is mandatory, then it has either exercised 
prudent restraint or ducked an important question. 
A defender of traditional two-step Chevron might add that judicial discretion in 
this context raises its own legitimacy concerns. Federal judicial authority is 
normally thought to emanate not from discretion, but from the need to resolve a 
concrete legal dispute.91 To authorize gratuitous judicial rulings arguably 
transforms courts into de facto legislatures. And once courts have license to reach 
out beyond what is necessary to resolve the case at hand, they might exercise that 
discretion opportunistically. For example, courts might reach the mandatoriness 
question only when the agency’s interpretation is attractive (to the judges) as a 
matter of policy. 
In comparing the various versions of Chevron, the key variables appear to be the 
following: (1) how often agencies are challenged for adopting statutory readings 
that are not just reasonable, but mandatory; (2) how efficiently and accurately 
courts can identify mandatory as opposed to reasonable agency interpretations in 
cases where only reasonableness is at issue; (3) how willing courts are to find 
statutes mandatory, even when not required to do so; and (4) how forcefully 
legitimacy concerns counsel judicial restraint in the Chevron context. 
B. The Analogy to Qualified Immunity 
The foregoing three versions of Chevron might usefully be compared and 
contrasted with the imperfectly analogous context of qualified immunity. By way 
of background, qualified-immunity cases raise two questions: (i) on the merits, did 
the official violate the law, and (ii) was the official’s view of the law reasonable? If 
the court affirmatively answers the first question, it establishes a new legal 
principle binding on future officials. But if the court affirmatively answers only the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 48 (discussing Stephenson and Vermeule). 
 89. PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 90. E.g., S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2352 n.5 (2012) (citing Cent. 
Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006)). 
 91. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. 
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)). 
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second question, then it does nothing more than excuse the official from liability, 
without establishing a prospective bar on official conduct.92 
Various decision procedures are available in qualified-immunity cases. Under 
Saucier v. Katz, courts were once obliged to answer the merits question in every 
case, thereby clarifying the law and providing binding guidance for future 
officials.93 Today, under Pearson v. Callahan, courts retain the option of reaching 
the merits and thereby making prospectively binding law, even when the case could 
be disposed of based on a reasonableness finding alone.94 And, in Camreta v. 
Greene, three Justices of the Supreme Court floated a third, as-yet-untested 
possibility—namely, that courts should answer only the reasonableness question, 
without unnecessarily reaching the merits.95 These three versions of the qualified-
immunity inquiry are outlined in the table below. 
 





Pearson Camreta Dissenters 
 
1. Was the Official’s 
action constitutional? 
 
2. Was the Official’s 
action reasonable? 
 
1. Was the Official’s 
action reasonable?  
 




1. Was the Official’s 
action reasonable?  
 
The above three views of how courts should decide qualified-immunity cases 
nicely line up with the three varieties of Chevron summarized in Table 2. 
Traditional two-step Chevron is analogous to the now-abandoned Saucier regime, 
in that both approaches required courts to reach merits issues unnecessarily for the 
sake of clarifying the law. Optional two-step is akin to the status quo qualified-
immunity regime under Pearson, where courts have the option, but not the 
obligation, to reach the merits unnecessarily. And one-step Chevron is like the still-
untested view that courts should not reach underlying merits issues at all when their 
decisions culminate in findings of qualified immunity. 
The foregoing pairing of Chevron approaches with qualified-immunity cases 
tends to favor the optional two-step approach, since that version of Chevron aligns 
with the now-reigning approach to qualified immunity. But qualified-immunity 
doctrine itself is dynamic and, indeed, may not yet have come to rest. As a result, 
the history of qualified-immunity jurisprudence offers support not just for optional 
two-step, but also for each of the other versions of Chevron. In Camreta, for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). 
 93. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 94. Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. 
 95. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2036 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
alternative solution, as Justice Kennedy suggests, is to end the extraordinary practice of 
ruling upon constitutional questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified 
immunity. . . . I would be willing to consider it in an appropriate case.”) (citations omitted); 
id. at 2043–45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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example, legitimacy concerns encouraged three Justices to entertain what might be 
called “one-step qualified immunity.”96 And the fact that the Supreme Court once 
adhered to the two-step procedure set out in Saucier confirms that there is 
something to be said for requiring courts to clarify the law under traditional two-
step Chevron.97 
Moreover, academic arguments over qualified-immunity doctrine often parallel, 
and so shed light on, some of the previously noted objections against optional two-
step Chevron. For example, the discretionary power to make unnecessary law in 
qualified-immunity cases has led to concerns that courts might opportunistically 
reach the merits only when doing so is attractive to the judges as a matter of 
policy.98 Commentators have also expressed misgivings about treating gratuitous 
judicial statements—dicta—as binding precedent, even in situations where the 
Supreme Court has invited that practice.99 As we have seen, analogous versions of 
both concerns are present in connection with optional two-step Chevron.100 
The analogy to qualified immunity illuminates at least one important respect in 
which the case for traditional or optional two-step Chevron is stronger than the case 
for unnecessary merits decisions in qualified-immunity cases. Under Saucier, 
courts were required—and, under Pearson, they are now permitted—to make 
merits determinations that cut against an ultimate finding in favor of immunity. For 
example, a qualified-immunity decision might find a particular search 
unconstitutional, but nonetheless recognize that a reasonable officer could have 
thought otherwise. In that scenario, the finding that the officer’s action was 
unconstitutional would cut against (though of course would not refute) the 
subsequent holding in favor of awarding that officer immunity. By contrast, 
traditional and optional two-step Chevron would create unnecessary legal rulings 
that reinforce the court’s ultimate disposition: the agency is said to be, not just 
reasonable, but indisputably correct. Because mandatoriness findings arguably 
establish the agency’s right to prevail for an analytically distinct reason,101 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Cf. id. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(discussing “the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions”). 
 97. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (holding that while “the Saucier protocol should not 
be regarded as mandatory in all cases, we continue to recognize that it is often beneficial”). 
 98. See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 
SUP. CT. REV. 139, 142–43 (discussing opportunistic merits decisions in qualified-immunity 
cases). 
 99. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 847, 872–82 (2005); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About 
Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006) (extensively criticizing Saucier for mandating the 
creation of dicta and for its treatment as precedent). 
 100. See supra Part II.A. 
 101. Courts sometimes adopt dual holdings separately applying more and less demanding 
standards of review. E.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1145 n.5 (2013) 
(“[T]o the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and is distinct from the 
‘clearly impending’ requirement, respondents fall short of even that standard . . . .”); United 
States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We conclude that under the 
circumstances, Trooper Smith had either probable cause to stop Mr. Ozbirn for committing a 
violation of a Kansas traffic law, or the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to justify 
an investigatory stop.”). 
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traditional two-step Chevron can be likened to courts’ long-recognized authority to 
issue holdings in the alternative.102 
On the other hand, perhaps the strongest argument for unnecessarily reaching 
the merits in qualified-immunity cases—the fear of permanent legal ambiguity—
does not apply in connection with Chevron. As the Court has explained: “if the 
policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified immunity 
whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of primary conduct, [then] 
standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain,” perhaps for long 
periods of time.103 In other words, qualified immunity could allow unlawful 
governmental actions to be upheld as reasonable over and over again, with no 
guaranteed mechanism for ever finding them unlawful. Indeed, the day when 
federal courts would finally reach the merits “may never come.”104 By contrast, 
agencies that deviate from mandatory readings can be challenged and then found to 
have acted unreasonably. Thus, one-step Chevron—unlike one-step qualified 
immunity—does not threaten to leave unlawful government conduct protected by a 
permanent state of jurisprudential “limbo.”105 
Chevron and qualified immunity are also distinguishable in terms of their 
subject matter, but those differences tend to be mutually offsetting. Qualified 
immunity typically pertains to constitutional rights, and there are special concerns 
in that context: constitutional decisions are normally avoided until necessary,106 and 
constitutional rules that are left unenforced in court may not be enforced at all. On 
both fronts, Chevron is a lower-stakes proposition: there is no special rule 
commanding courts to avoid statutory holdings, and administrative law principles 
backed by Congress might be viewed as less dependent on judicial enforcement 
than constitutional ones. Chevron also focuses on constraining agencies, whereas 
qualified immunity largely applies to individual officers, like police. It is not 
obvious which type of governmental decision maker—powerful, highly visible 
regulators, or a diffuse set of inexpert and potentially anonymous officers—is more 
in need of clear, constraining law. 
In the end, the analogy to qualified-immunity jurisprudence cannot answer 
which version of Chevron is most defensible, and that normative question will have 
to be addressed on its own terms. But the qualified-immunity cases nonetheless 
shed light on the similar issues presented by Chevron. And, to the extent that there 
are good reasons to take different approaches in the Chevron and qualified-
immunity contexts, courts and commentators should confront and justify their 
choice to adopt divergent approaches. Indeed, the burden should be on critics of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See, e.g., McClellan v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 925 n.21 (5th Cir. 
1977) (“It does not make a reason given for a conclusion in a case obiter dictum, because it 
is only one of two reasons for the same conclusion.” (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 340 (1928))). But see Maxwell 
L. Stearns & Michael Abramowicz, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005) (criticizing 
“the general understanding that alternative holdings in a case all count as holdings”). 
 103. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). 
 104. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
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optional two-step to explain why that discretionary procedure is inadvisable in 
agency-deference cases, even though a substantially similar deference regime is 
now settled practice in cases raising qualified immunity. At a minimum, comparing 
Chevron with qualified immunity demonstrates that there is an important normative 
choice to be made in both contexts. 
C. Deriving Standards for Judicial Discretion 
The analogy to qualified immunity points out perhaps the largest gap in the 
existing literature on Chevron’s structure. Because existing commentary has not 
identified the possibility of an optional two-step approach to Chevron, there has 
been no discussion of when courts might, in their discretion, reach the issue of 
mandatoriness. By contrast, the Supreme Court has supplied significant (though by 
no means exhaustive) guidance as to when discretion should be exercised in the 
qualified-immunity context. The Court’s qualified-immunity jurisprudence thus 
offers a guide to the appropriate exercises of discretion in the Chevron context. 
Pearson supplies the leading statement of when discretionary merits findings are 
appropriate in qualified immunity cases.107 The Court’s discussion intermittently 
addressed the inherent trade-offs posed by unnecessary law clarification. For 
example, Pearson opened by pairing the general benefit of law clarification—
namely, that it “promotes the development of constitutional precedent”108—with 
the corresponding costs of requiring time-consuming, expensive litigation on a 
matter that amounts to an “essentially academic exercise.”109 The Court also noted 
that reaching the merits in qualified-immunity cases “departs from the general rule 
of constitutional avoidance.”110 So the Court was faced with weighty concerns 
cutting both for and against unnecessary lawmaking. Realizing this, Pearson 
directed courts to consider a range of case-specific considerations.111 
While Pearson’s discussion of this issue is not so clearly organized, it is 
possible to discern two clusters of circumstances when, in the Court’s view, the 
benefits of clarifying the law are outweighed by countervailing problems. 
First, unnecessary lawmaking is to be avoided when the benefits of law 
clarification are unusually minimal. Pearson supplied several examples of cases 
falling in this general category, such as: (i) when “the constitutional question is so 
factbound that the decision provides little guidance” to courts and private parties;112 
(ii) “when it appears that the question will soon be decided by a higher court,” 
thereby diminishing the need for immediate resolution;113 and (iii) when “resolution 
of the constitutional question requires clarification of an ambiguous state statute” 
that might subsequently be reinterpreted by a state court.114 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2032 (explaining that the Court in Pearson had “detailed 
a range of circumstances in which courts should address only the immunity question”). 
 108. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 109. Id. at 237. 
 110. Id. at 241. 
 111. Id. at 237–40. 
 112. Id. at 237. 
 113. Id. at 238. 
 114. Id. 
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Second, unnecessary lawmaking is to be avoided when it poses a heightened risk 
of error.115 Again, Pearson supplied examples, such as: (i) when the plaintiff’s 
claims “may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed,” thereby 
forcing the court to speculate as to the ramifications of its decision;116 (ii) when 
“the briefing of constitutional questions is woefully inadequate” to ensure an 
intelligent ruling;117 and (iii) when “the defendant’s right to appeal the adverse 
holding on the constitutional question may be contested” based on the general rule 
that prevailing parties cannot appeal.118 
Some of Pearson’s guideposts do not intelligently carry over to the Chevron 
context. For example, federal deference cases do not generally pose issues of state 
statutory interpretation or turn on factual issues requiring record development. The 
other factors, however, carry over with only modest adjustments. Thus, courts 
might conclude that discretionary mandatoriness findings are appropriate only 
when: (i) the legal issue posed is likely to implicate future agency action, so that 
resolving it promptly will provide guidance to the government and to private 
parties; (ii) there is no special reason to think that a higher court or regulatory 
change will soon resolve the issue;119 (iii) the briefing is strong, particularly as to 
the unnecessary question of mandatoriness; and (iv) the agency’s right to appeal a 
constraining mandatoriness finding is unlikely to be contested, perhaps because the 
other side is itself likely to seek further review.120 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. Cf. id. at 239 (“[T]he first step of the Saucier procedure may create a risk of bad 
decisionmaking.”). 
 116. Id. at 239 (quoting Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept., 315 F.3d 65, 69–70 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 240. Pearson raised this point as a general problem, but the more recent 
Camreta decision shows it to be a case-specific concern. In permitting an appeal by a 
defendant who had lost on the merits but ultimately won on qualified immunity, Camreta 
rested on the fact that one of the two defendants had to change the way he did his job in light 
of the merits decision issued by the court of appeals. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 
2020, 2029 (2011). The other defendant, by contrast, was no longer employed in the relevant 
job and so apparently lacked standing to seek certiorari. See id. at 2034 n.9. So, if only the 
second defendant had been in the case, Supreme Court review would appear to have been 
impossible. Anticipating that result, perhaps courts should refrain from unnecessarily 
reaching the merits when they foresee that the defendant will be unable to appeal. 
 119. Given that the main benefit of mandatoriness findings is that they clarify the law, 
perhaps the Supreme Court should be more eager to issue such holdings than intermediate 
courts, which should in turn be more eager than trial courts. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 
(2014). 
 120. Continuing the analogy between Chevron and qualified immunity, perhaps the 
government should be able to appeal an unwanted step-one finding that its present 
interpretation is not just reasonable, but mandatory. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[D]oes the 
victorious agency have the right to appeal a Court of Appeals judgment in its favor, on the 
ground that the text in question is in fact not (as the Court of Appeals held) unambiguous, so 
the agency should be able to change its view in the future?” (emphasis in original)). 
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The foregoing rules of thumb are helpful, but may not go far enough. To prevent 
themselves from opportunistically resolving unnecessary legal issues121—in either 
the qualified immunity or Chevron contexts—courts should adopt objective criteria 
for unnecessary lawmaking.122 In qualified-immunity cases, courts could reach out 
to resolve the merits if, but only if, they can point to a number of other cases in 
which the same issue has already been raised, only to be avoided on grounds of 
qualified immunity.123 This rule provides some assurance both that law-clarification 
would be helpful and that the discretionary power to reach the merits would be 
implemented in a neutral way.  
An analogous objective criterion is available in the Chevron context: if a court 
can point to a number of litigants who have attempted to interpret the statutory 
provision in question, then the court might fairly conclude that it has obtained 
sufficient familiarity with the provision to have anticipated—and ruled out—every 
interpretation that an agency could plausibly put forward. In unusual 
circumstances, this requirement might even be satisfied within the confines of a 
single case, such as when a number of diverse parties offer well-litigated statutory 
interpretations.124 By adopting this objective test of interpretive experience, a court 
would ensure not only that it has become deeply immersed in the relevant statutory 
scheme, but also that resolving the issue of mandatoriness is likely to be of 
considerable utility. 
D. The Psychological Burdens of Unnecessary Lawmaking 
In a provocative passage, Pearson offered an important insight into judicial 
psychology that overlaps with an academic debate concerning Chevron deference. 
Because it is impossible to “specify the sequence in which judges reach their 
conclusions in their own internal thought processes,”125 Pearson recognized that 
“there will be cases in which a court will rather quickly and easily decide that there 
was no violation of clearly established law before turning to the more difficult 
question whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.”126 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. Cf. supra note 98 (discussing analogous concerns in the qualified-immunity context). 
 122. Courts sometimes create similar guidelines via self-imposed rule. E.g., SUP. CT. R. 
10 (attempting to list objective criteria for the discretionary decision to grant certiorari, such 
as the existence of a circuit conflict). 
 123. For a somewhat similar proposal, see Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Joshua Matz, 
Avoiding Permanent Limbo: Qualified Immunity and the Elaboration of Constitutional 
Rights from Saucier to Camreta (and Beyond), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 643, 678 (2011) 
(arguing that the “principal determinant of a decision to reach the merits after finding 
qualified immunity ought to be the availability of adequate opportunities for constitutional 
elaboration elsewhere,” while adding that courts should also consider “such factors as the 
importance of the constitutional issue, the frequency with which it has been invoked or will 
likely be invoked again, and the extent to which government officials lack adequate guidance 
from circuit law”) (emphasis added). 
 124. Compare infra note 150 (providing a case where the test is satisfied), with infra note 
159 (providing a case where the test isn’t satisfied). 
 125. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239; cf. supra note 60 (discussing how to order 
the two steps of traditional two-step). 
 126. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239. 
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Unfortunately, Pearson conflated this important point with the more general 
observation that courts may not “devote as much care” when “uttering 
pronouncements that play no role in their adjudication.”127 In other words, the Pearson 
Court felt that judges might give inadequate attention to constitutional issues whose 
resolution (the judges anticipated) would not affect the disposition of the case at hand. 
Yet the implications of Pearson’s psychological insight are more significant than 
the Court let on. In short, the psychological burdens associated with qualified 
immunity potentially go to judicial bias, and not just judicial inattention. When a judge 
eyeballs a constitutional claim and quickly ascertains that the officer didn’t violate 
clearly established law, it is possible that the judge has implicitly adopted a negative 
view of the plaintiff’s underlying claim on the merits. The defendant, after all, has 
already been adjudged a reasonable officer, whereas the constitutional claimant has 
become—quite literally—a loser. That cognitive development may favor the 
government, perhaps in ways that the judge does not consciously appreciate. 
Conversely, a judge who begins the analysis by assessing the merits of a constitutional 
claim and finding a violation might then have difficulty stepping back to determine 
whether, at the time of the violation, the officer’s conduct was nonetheless reasonable. 
Analogous psychological problems have garnered attention in the context of 
Chevron deference. As Justice Stephen Breyer has written (and others have agreed128): 
“It is difficult, after having examined a legal question in depth with the object of 
deciding it correctly, to believe both that the agency’s interpretation is legally wrong, 
and that its interpretation is reasonable.”129 In other words, step one of traditional two-
step Chevron forces judges to think about what Congress has unambiguously tried to do 
in a particular provision, and undertaking that inquiry may prevent judges from 
impartially applying step two. Stephenson and Vermeule count this concern as a point 
in favor of one-step Chevron.130 By asking a singular question, the argument goes, one-
step frees courts from having to ask about “best” interpretations,131 thereby allowing for 
quick, unbiased conclusions as to whether agency interpretations are reasonable.132 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. See id. at 239–40 (quoting Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 128. Professors Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule have emphasized this point in 
arguing for replacing Chevron with a supermajority voting rule. See Jacob E. Gersen & 
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 697–98 (2007). 
 129. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 379 (1986) (emphasis in original). 
 130. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 605 (“For one thing, if judges spend 
an inordinate amount of time trying to figure out the best construction of the statute, it may 
be difficult for them to shift mental gears to decide whether an agency interpretation that 
differs from the judge’s sense of the best interpretation is nonetheless reasonable.” (emphasis 
in original)); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Costs of Voting Rule Chevron: A 
Comment on Gersen and Vermeule’s Proposal, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 238, 241–42 
(2007) (“I think (though I cannot prove) that in a typical Chevron case, the judge . . . stops 
[analyzing the agency’s view] not when she has determined that the agency’s interpretation 
is the best one, but when she has decided that it falls into the realm of plausibility . . . .”). 
 131. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 605. Stephenson and Vermeule refer to 
“best” interpretations because they do not acknowledge the distinct category of mandatory 
interpretations. See supra note 64. 
 132. But see infra text accompanying note 173 (discussing empirical findings that 
undermine this point). 
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Optional two-step replicates many of the benefits associated with one-step 
Chevron, while avoiding the psychological difficulties suggested by Pearson. As 
an initial matter, optional two-step would allow courts to ask first, and often 
exclusively, about the relatively easy question of reasonableness. And only after a 
court has assured itself that the agency’s reading is reasonable would it even 
consider whether to reach the more difficult optional issue of mandatoriness. Thus, 
courts applying optional two-step would often both begin and end their 
reasonableness analyses without asking about “best” interpretations at all.133 
And even when courts applying optional two-step did reach the issue of 
mandatoriness, they would not encounter the psychological burdens suggested in 
Pearson. As noted above, a court that immediately recognizes the existence of 
qualified immunity may have a hard time fairly contemplating whether the 
admittedly “reasonable” defendant nonetheless acted unconstitutionally. But there 
is no similar tension in asking whether a reasonable agency interpretation is also 
mandatory.134 Knowing that an agency acted reasonably simply tees up the 
possibility that the agency also acted in a way that was mandated by law. The first 
conclusion does not prejudice the second one. 
Given the above, traditional two-step Chevron—like the “rigid order of battle” 
adopted in Saucier135—may pose special psychological burdens for judges. By 
contrast, one-step avoids those problems, and optional two-step largely seems able 
to do so as well. 
E. The Incomplete Case for Optional Two-Step 
As promised, each substantively distinct version of Chevron has its own 
strengths and weaknesses. Traditional two-step requires a relatively complex 
analysis in every case and may impose significant psychological burdens on judges, 
thereby increasing the risk of error; but it also ensures that courts seize every 
opportunity to find that agency interpretations are mandatory. One-step is the 
simplest of the three options and accordingly minimizes the possibility that 
psychological burdens might warp outcomes; but its elegance comes at the steep 
price of forgoing many opportunities to find statutory clarity. 
Optional two-step promises to avoid the deficiencies of its stricter cousins. By 
embracing a discretionary decision-making process, optional two-step would allow 
courts to reach the issue of mandatoriness when doing so is most beneficial and 
least likely to result in error. But optional two-step can reliably achieve this goal 
only if courts identify objective criteria to guide their Chevron discretion. As 
argued above, for example, courts might ask whether many litigants have 
interpreted the statutory provision at issue. An affirmative answer would suggest 
both that the provision is important enough to benefit from law-clarification, and 
that the court is equipped to resolve the mandatoriness question. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 605. 
 134. Cf. supra text accompanying note 102. 
 135. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009) (citing Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 
615, 622 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
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Yet the normative case for optional two-step remains incomplete absent 
consideration of actual judicial practice. To address those important issues, the next 
Part turns to the empirical structure of Chevron deference. 
III. THE EMPIRICAL STRUCTURE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
Arguments for one or another version of Chevron invariably rest on 
controversial claims about actual judicial practice. For example, commentators 
often assert that their own views accord with the weight of the case law, that 
opposing views of Chevron threaten disruption of the status quo, or that various 
proposed reforms either would or would not meaningfully change existing 
trends.136 This Part tackles the foregoing empirical questions by examining a 
number of important recent decisions, as well as by examining all published federal 
court-of-appeals decisions citing Chevron in 2011. Because (as we have seen) there 
are three substantively distinct versions of Chevron, and each has its own unique 
set of advantages and disadvantages, it should be no surprise that courts have at 
various times appeared to adopt different solutions. Still, overall practice in federal 
appellate courts broadly supports the optional two-step approach—even though 
current doctrine has not identified that approach or justified its sub silentio revision 
of the traditional two-step Chevron framework. 
A. In the Supreme Court 
Recent Supreme Court cases frequently depict Chevron as a two-step inquiry.137 
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, for 
example, the Court discussed and applied each of Chevron’s two steps at length 
before expressly upholding an agency interpretation as “reasonable” at step two.138 
In a similar vein, Judulang v. Holder discussed “the second step of the test we 
announced in Chevron,” while comparing it with arbitrariness review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.139 And in Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., a 
particular statute provided “unambiguous” support for the agency’s proffered 
reading, thereby allowing the Court to resolve the case without asking the step-two 
question whether the agency’s view was “entitled to deference.”140 
But many recent decisions cast Chevron as an essentially unitary inquiry. In 
Holder v. Gutierrez, for example, the Court held that an agency’s interpretation 
“prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. See infra note 174. 
 137. For the most recent example, see City of Arlington v. FCC, which referred to 
Chevron’s “now-canonical formulation” involving “two questions.” 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 
(2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 138. 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011). Notably, Mayo understood step two to encompass 
arbitrariness review. Id. at 711, 714–15. For an older two-step case, see Barnhart v. Walton, 
535 U.S. 212, 217–18 (2002). 
 139. 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011). 
 140. 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1363, n.12 (2012). This case didn’t use step one/two terminology. 
Cf. infra note 168. 
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possible interpretation or even the one a court might think best.”141 And, in 
upholding the agency’s interpretation, the Court distinguished between the 
questions of reasonableness and mandatoriness: “We think the BIA’s view on 
imputation meets that standard, and so need not decide if the statute permits any 
other construction.”142 Likewise, Astrue v. Capato said that “even if the [Social 
Security Administration’s] longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable 
one, it is at least a permissible construction that garners the Court’s respect under 
Chevron.”143 In both of these cases, the Court expressly declined to determine 
whether the statute unambiguously favored the agency’s reading, as would 
traditionally be required under Chevron step one. 
On balance, the Supreme Court’s recent cases appear to reflect an optional two-
step approach. In cases like Sea-Land Services, the Court finds agency 
interpretations to be not just reasonable, but mandatory. At the same time, the 
Court often declines to reach the issue of mandatoriness. So the Court sometimes 
asks about mandatoriness and sometimes chooses not to do so—just as optional 
two-step would recommend. 
Even Justice Scalia’s recent opinion citing Stephenson and Vermeule could be 
read to accommodate discretion in this area. To be sure, Justice Scalia asserted—
incorrectly144—that “[w]hether a particular statute is ambiguous makes no 
difference if the interpretation adopted by the agency is clearly reasonable—and it 
would be a waste of time to conduct that inquiry.”145 But Justice Scalia also said 
that “‘Step 1’ has never been an essential part of Chevron analysis” and is “hardly 
mandatory.”146 In saying that “Step 1” should be viewed as unessential and non-
mandatory, Justice Scalia may have left open the possibility that the mandatoriness 
question is warranted in some cases. And that, as we have seen, is optional two-
step. 
In effect, the Court has quietly brought its agency-deference and qualified-
immunity doctrines into alignment. Though unnecessary lawmaking was originally 
deemed obligatory both in Chevron and in Saucier, the Court has gradually backed 
off those stringent demands in favor of a discretionary approach. But while 
Pearson made that doctrinal transition explicit in the qualified-immunity context, 
the Court has so far failed to clarify that Chevron’s two-step approach has likewise 
become optional.147 It is time to do so. 
B. In the Courts of Appeals 
Perhaps because of the Supreme Court’s failure to specify what analytic regime 
it is applying—or even to identify the optional two-step approach as an available 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2012). 
 142. Id. 
 143. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012). 
 144. Stephenson and Vermeule advanced a similarly overbroad claim. See supra note 46 
and accompanying text. 
 145. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 n.1 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
 146. Id. at 1846 & n.1. 
 147. See supra Part II.B. 
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option—experience in the federal courts of appeals is mixed. However, courts 
regularly apply two-step Chevron in cases where it makes a difference.148 By 
contrast, no court consistently applies one-step Chevron as an obligatory approach. 
Indeed, one of the few judicial decisions that explicitly invokes Stephenson and 
Vermeule’s paper cites it as a “but see” to the proposition that the court would 
follow “the familiar two-part Chevron framework.”149 
For a recent, high-profile example of two-step Chevron in action in the federal 
courts of appeals, consider the recent challenge brought in the D.C. Circuit by 
states and private parties against the EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gas.150 The 
Chevron question in the case was whether the EPA had reasonably interpreted the 
statutory term “any air pollutant” to include greenhouse gas.151 Distinguishing 
Chevron’s two steps, the D.C. Circuit resolved the issue at step one by expressly 
holding that the statutory provision’s meaning was “unambiguous” and that 
Congress had directly spoken to the question.152 In particular, the court held that the 
statutory phrase “any air pollutant” unambiguously included “all regulated air 
pollutants, including greenhouse gas.”153 This holding—which the Supreme Court 
has now granted certiorari to review154—meant that the statute’s broad language 
was impliedly limited to “regulated” pollutants, but was not impliedly limited in 
any of the other ways suggested by the state and private-party challengers. 
That step-one holding mattered. If the political winds had shifted and the EPA 
desired to change course, both the agency and potential challengers would have 
known that one avenue of statutory interpretation had been closed off, at least in 
cases heard by future D.C. Circuit panels. As in Sea-Land Services,155 added legal 
clarity would have been forgone if the court had followed one-step Chevron and 
asked only whether the agency’s view was reasonable. 
Remarkably, federal judges sometimes dispute (in effect) whether to apply the 
two-step or one-step versions of Chevron. For example, in Teva Pharmaceuticals, 
USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, the D.C. Circuit considered the FDA’s statutory 
responsibilities with regard to filings for new drug applications under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.156 The agency suggested that its role was largely ministerial, in that it 
should simply accept certain information supplied by the new drug applicant. The 
D.C. Circuit majority agreed with the agency’s position. Indeed, the court held that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See, e.g., Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2012); Khalid v. Holder, 655 
F.3d 363, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2011); Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 632 F.3d 584, 596 
(9th Cir. 2011); Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 149. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 150. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 134–36. 
 153. Id. (emphasis omitted). All three panel judges later underlined this point when 
writing to explain the D.C. Circuit’s decision to deny en banc review. See Coal. for 
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 
20, 2012) (Sentelle, C.J., concurring in denial of en banc review) (“[T]he panel’s 
interpretation of the statute is the only plausible one.”). 
 154. See No. 12-1248 (cert. granted Oct. 15, 2013). 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
 156. 548 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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the agency’s proffered interpretation of its regulatory obligations was not just 
reasonable, but mandatory. In doing so, the court specified: “[W]e review FDA’s 
interpretation of the Act it administers under step one of the two-step analysis in 
Chevron.”157 
Judge Stephen Williams concurred specifically to dispute the majority’s express 
step-one holding.158 As Judge Williams put it, the majority opinion “seems to imply 
that the statute requires the FDA to accept” a new drug applicant’s self-reported 
information and so “impos[es] on [the FDA] the ministerial role that it has chosen 
for itself.”159 Judge Williams disagreed with the majority’s step-one mandatoriness 
finding. “I have seen no reasoning,” he explained, “that would support the idea that 
the statute mandates a ministerial role . . . .”160 The judge then added that, “for this 
case, all that is needed is a conclusion that the FDA’s adoption of that role is 
reasonable.”161 In other words, Judge Williams objected to the majority’s decision 
to opine—unnecessarily, but in compliance with traditional two-step Chevron—on 
the statute’s mandatory meaning. 
The fact that federal judges sometimes dispute whether to adhere to traditional 
two-step Chevron demonstrates that the choice among the varieties of Chevron has 
real consequences. If one-step Chevron were adopted, the result would not be a 
costless clarification, as Stephenson and Vermeule believe,162 but a substantive 
change in a fundamental principle of administrative law. Yet this important choice 
has so far gone unappreciated by scholars, and the few cases that do address this 
issue do not approach it any systematic way. What courts need are principles for 
the appropriate exercise of their Chevron discretion. 
C. A Data-Driven Assessment 
Many arguments concerning the structure of Chevron deference rest on 
empirical claims, yet solid data of the relevant type is hard to come by.163 To 
support one-step Chevron, for example, Stephenson and Vermeule cited Orin 
Kerr’s important 1998 study on deference in administrative-law cases.164 According 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. Id. at 105–06. 
 158. Id. at 108 (Williams, J. concurring). 
 159. Id.; see also id. at 110 (disputing any conclusion that “the statute locks the FDA into 
a ministerial role”). 
 160. Id. at 108. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 609 (asserting that one-step Chevron has 
“no collateral cost”). 
 163. Most empirical studies on judicial application of Chevron have focused on bottom-
line outcomes and assessed those results in light of independent variables such as judicial 
ideology. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy?: An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006). These 
studies, while illuminating in many ways, do not look under the hood of the Chevron inquiry 
to ascertain, for example, what work is being done at step one as opposed to step two. 
 164. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 605 n.30 (citing Orin S. Kerr, Shedding 
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1998) (reporting that, in 1995 and 1996, published 
federal court of appeals decisions “condensed the two-step test into a single question of 
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to Kerr’s research, more than a quarter of published Chevron cases during a two-
year period collapsed the traditional two-step inquiry into just one step.165 
However, Kerr’s study was not focused on the structure of Chevron deference and 
so did not collect data on several questions relevant to present debates over 
Chevron’s structure. And, of course, Kerr’s data is now over fifteen years old, so 
trends in Chevron deference could have shifted over time. This Part provides an 
updated empirical assessment of several questions specifically relevant to debates 
over the structure of Chevron deference. 
1. The Data and Basic Results 
The data analyzed below come from a LexisNexis search for all published 
federal court of appeals decisions in the year 2011 that cited Chevron. This search 
resulted in a dataset comprising some 191 cases. However, many of these cases did 
not actually undertake a Chevron deference inquiry. For example, about twenty-
five cases declined to apply Chevron after conducting what is sometimes called a 
“step zero” analysis.166 Other cases cited Chevron outside the agency deference 
context, such as to establish that plain text controls questions of statutory 
interpretation.167 Excluding the foregoing types of cases left 110 separate Chevron 
applications. These applications were coded according to whether they applied 
Chevron as a one- or two-step inquiry, whether the agency’s interpretation was 
upheld or invalidated, and whether any invalidation occurred at step one or step 
two. The results are summarized below and depicted in the following tables (with 
approximate percentages). 
 















Above, Table 4 shows the distribution of cases that announced Chevron as 
having one step (asking only about reasonableness) or two steps (asking first 
whether Congress has unambiguously addressed the issue, and then whether the 
agency’s reading is permissible). This table also includes a separate category for 
                                                                                                                 
whether the interpretation was ‘reasonable’ in 28% of the applications”)); see also Peter H. 
Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1023 & n.94, 1025 (1990) (discussing evidence 
concerning the conventional view that Chevron established a more deferential two-step 
inquiry). 
 165. See Kerr, supra note 164, at 30. 
 166. For an explanation of the term “step zero,” see supra note 1. 
 167. See, e.g., United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 519 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The 
starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for ‘[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter.’” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993) 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984))); 
United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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cases that quote and apply only step one, without either reaching or mentioning 
step two. As the data indicate, the great majority of cases identify the two discrete 
steps of the traditional Chevron inquiry. However, a substantial minority of cases 
characterize Chevron as having only one step, as recommended by Stephenson and 
Vermeule. Finally, the table also indicates that a small number of cases ask only 
whether the agency’s interpretation is unambiguously correct, without mentioning 
step two. 
 















26.3% 13% 2.7% 
 
Table 5 shows the distribution of outcomes in Chevron cases. The first three 
columns respectively record holdings that agency readings are reasonable, 
unreasonable, or mandatory. The table also notes a few cases in which courts found 
a statute ambiguous at step one but then expressly resolved the case on other 
grounds, without applying step two. This table shows that the government won 
about three-quarters of all Chevron cases. Further, the table shows that 
mandatoriness findings comprise a significant fraction of Chevron holdings. 
 
























 0 — 12 15% 2 50% 
 
Table 6 combines the information in the previous two tables to show outcomes 
in Chevron cases under the one- and two-step versions of Chevron. This table also 
includes a category labeled “only first step,” to reflect the handful of decisions that 
rely on a finding of unambiguousness without indicating that that finding 
constitutes a step-one holding.168 As the shaded cells indicate, agency decisions are 
found unreasonable with almost equal frequency under both the one-step and the 
two-step versions of Chevron. The main difference between the one- and two-step 
versions is, predictably, that only two-step Chevron results in mandatoriness 





                                                                                                                 
 
 168. These cases may be applying a nominally one-step version Chevron that nonetheless 
includes a tripartite menu of possible options. See supra note 40; see also supra text 
accompanying note 140 (discussing Sea-Land Services). 
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Table 7. Invalidations Under Two-Step Chevron. 
 
 
Fails at Step 1 
 











Finally, Table 7 provides a more detailed view of the roughly 28% of two-step 
Chevron cases that invalidated the agency’s interpretation. About three-quarters of 
two-step invalidations occurred at step one. In addition, two cases ruled against the 
government specifically at step two based on arbitrariness findings.169 Finally, two 
decisions purported to reject agency interpretations under both steps, while one 
case defied clear categorization.170 
2. How the Data Inform Debates Over Chevron 
As commentators have observed, the simple methodology employed above—
though common in this area of scholarship—rests on a limited sample as well as on 
a number of inevitably disputable judgments.171 The resulting data thus provide 
only a rough indicator of actual appellate practice. Nonetheless, the evidence 
suggests several conclusions. 
First, the data shed light on the picture of Chevron’s logical structure outlined 
above in Part I. For example, Tables 5 and 6 reflect that only two-step versions of 
Chevron generate mandatoriness findings. Further, Table 7 suggests that step one 
of traditional two-step Chevron screens out agency interpretations that would 
separately fail as unreasonable under step two, for only when courts view step two 
as arbitrariness review do steps one and two diverge. This result confirms, as 
argued in Part I, that traditional two-step Chevron contains a redundancy in that 
invalidations under each step are interchangeable.172 The substantive equivalence of 
step-one and step-two invalidations finds further support in the rare but remarkable 
practice of invalidating agency interpretations under both steps, apparently for the 
same reasons. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See supra Part I.D. 
 170. The case that Table 7 marks as ambiguous, California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. 
Department of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011), was the single most difficult case to 
code. The Chevron issue was whether an agency had engaged in statutorily mandated 
“consultation.” Id. Before addressing this question, the court block-quoted the traditional 
two-step summary of Chevron deference and noted during its summary of the parties’ 
positions that “[b]oth prongs of the Chevron standard are in play in this case.” Id. at 1084. 
Later, the court said both that it did not “read the statute as encompassing [the agency’s] 
proffered definition” and that it was enforcing “the definition that Congress intended.” Id. at 
1086–87. The case thus avoided specifying whether it was ruling on step one or two (or 
both). In any event, the decision’s ambiguity simply illustrates that, under traditional two-
step Chevron, invalidations under step one and step two are interchangeable. See supra text 
accompanying note 31. 
 171. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 164, at 21–22 (discussing the challenges of empirical 
studies of this kind). For an example of a case that was particularly difficult to code, see 
supra note 170. 
 172. See supra Part I.A. 
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Second, the data clarify some of the practical stakes in choosing among the 
versions of Chevron, particularly the choice whether to adopt one-step. As an initial 
matter, Table 6 suggests that whether courts apply one-step or two-step has no 
significant effect on agencies’ chances of victory. Instead, courts applying one-step 
and two-step Chevron both invalidated agency interpretations just over a quarter of 
the time. This finding undermines claims that psychological burdens might make 
one- or two-step Chevron more deferential.173 Still, moving to one-step Chevron 
would have a significant effect on Chevron practice. As Table 5 depicts, just over 
one-tenth of Chevron cases result in mandatoriness findings. Under one-step 
Chevron, those results would transform into mere reasonableness determinations. 
Third, current appellate practice significantly resembles, and may even 
implement, optional two-step Chevron. As noted in Part I, supporters of one- or 
two-step Chevron often argue that their preferred proposals mirror actual Chevron 
practice and, therefore, that alternatives could be confusing or destabilizing.174 The 
reality, however, is that current practice is already highly heterogeneous—and has 
been that way for a long time. Indeed, Kerr’s data from 1995 to 1996 show that 
over a quarter (28%) of all Chevron determinations turned on a one-step 
analysis.175 If anything, courts’ longstanding willingness to alternate between the 
one- and two-step versions of Chevron—including in the Supreme Court176—
suggests that current Chevron practice broadly reflects a valid if unidentified 
approach: optional two-step. 
Finally, if courts and commentators are to be faithful to existing practice, then 
Chevron discretion should be refined, not resisted. As the data indicate, courts 
already exercise considerable discretion when implementing Chevron. Instead of 
downplaying that reality or combating it by insisting on adherence to either one- or 
two-step across the board, commentators should aim to perfect the decision-making 
discretion underlying current practice. The most pressing task for future research is 
therefore to determine how judicial discretion in this area should be exercised. This 
Article has taken an initial step toward answering that question by mining 
qualified-immunity doctrine for principles that might guide discretionary Chevron 
determinations.177 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. Cf. supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing potential psychological burdens). 
 174. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing Stephenson and Vermeule). 
For another example, Bamberger and Strauss contend that the comparatively novel one-step 
view of Chevron “would muddy the doctrinal waters unnecessarily.” Bamberger & Strauss, 
supra note 15, at 624; see also id. at 621 (discussing similar concerns). 
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Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
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 176. See supra Part III.A. 
 177. See supra Part II.C. 
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CONCLUSION 
Chevron is due for a redesign. Justice Scalia and prominent scholars have 
argued that Chevron’s traditional two-step procedure is redundant and should be 
reduced to a single step. But each of Chevron’s two steps actually does unique 
work, as only step one reveals whether an agency’s interpretation is not just 
reasonable, but mandatory. Meanwhile, other judges and scholars argue that 
Chevron does indeed have two steps—but only because the second step consists of 
arbitrariness review. That approach compresses the distinct reasonableness and 
mandatoriness inquiries into an artificially singular first step, while making step 
two redundant with arbitrariness under the APA. Moreover, the existing debate has 
focused almost exclusively on descriptive or logical considerations, and so has 
overlooked that the structure of Chevron deference raises important normative 
issues. For example, traditional two-step fosters the rapid development of 
precedent, whereas one-step enforces norms of judicial restraint. 
This Article has offered a circumspect defense of a new version of Chevron 
called optional two-step, whereby courts have discretion to clarify the law by 
finding agency interpretations to be mandatory. This hybrid approach seeks to 
balance the values of law-clarification, decision-making efficiency, and judicial 
restraint. And, though it has never before been identified, optional two-step 
generally comports with recent practice in the Supreme Court and federal courts of 
appeals.178 What is more, the normative case for optional two-step finds surprising 
support in the analogous domain of qualified immunity, which has likewise given 
federal courts limited discretion to clarify the law, even when doing so is 
unnecessary to resolve the case at hand. Yet the appeal of optional two-step 
depends on frankly acknowledging that federal courts already exercise discretion in 
Chevron cases. By identifying new doctrinal guideposts that might focus and 
legitimize their exercise of Chevron discretion, courts can make progress toward 
redesigning Chevron. 
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